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This paper considers the impact of business and social networks on international trade
and foreign direct investment (FDI).  I propose that differences in the strength of network effects
across countries can produce asymmetric trade and investment flows that may lead to trade
friction.  This proposition is examined using a model of multi-product producers of a
differentiated product.  A firm from a country with strong network effects has a cost advantage
in selling to buyers from its own country.  This advantage results in lower inward FDI, lower
total imports but larger volumes of reverse imports (i.e., imports from overseas affiliates of that
country’s own firms) into the country with strong network effects.  The model’s predictions
match observed asymmetric trade and investment flows that sometimes lead to US-Japan trade
friction in industries such as automobiles.
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1.  Introduction
The importance of business and social networks for international trade has caught the
attention of economists in recent years.
1  In an international environment where contracts are not
always enforceable and product information is imperfect, relationships between buyers and
sellers matter.  In some countries and cultures, they seem to matter more than in others.  Japanese
keiretsu and overseas Chinese networks are often cited as examples of networks that affect
international trade.
2  This paper proposes that networks affect not only trade but also foreign
direct investment (FDI) and they can help to explain bilateral trade friction.  Differences in
network effects across countries can produce asymmetric trade and investment outcomes that
may lead to trade friction.  A country with particularly strong network effects, such as Japan,
may have lower inflows of both FDI and imports, and imports may include large amounts of
reverse imports (i.e., imports from overseas affiliates of that country’s own firms).  These low
inflows of FDI and imports may be inappropriately attributed to high market barriers rather than
to strong network effects.
3
Several empirical papers have confirmed that buyer-seller networks influence
international trade.  Gould (1994), Head and Ries (1998), and Rauch and Trindade (1999)
demonstrate the importance of network effects by examining the influence of immigrants on
international trade.  Immigrants provide information to associates in their countries of origin
regarding products currently supplied and demanded in their new location.  They have a
statistically significant positive effect on bilateral trade between their countries of emigration and
immigration.  Rauch (1999) finds that proximity and common language/colonial ties are more
important for trade in differentiated products than for trade in homogeneous goods.  This fits his2
hypothesis that search barriers to trade are higher for differentiated products, which allows
buyer-seller relationships to play a more important role in trade in differentiated goods.
Theoretical work that links network effects to international trade includes Rauch (1996),
McLaren (1999) and Casella and Rauch (2002).  Rauch (1996) adapts a search model from labor
economics to describe trade in differentiated products.  Government-sponsored export promotion
policies (e.g., trade missions) and Japan’s general trading companies (sogo shosha) can be
explained as means of economizing on these search costs across firms.  McLaren (1999)
examines the differences between contractual and noncontractual (or relational) industrial
procurement, comparing methods typically associated with Western versus Japanese firms.  He
builds a model that predicts that the latter will become more prevalent over time as the costs of
international transactions fall.  For this paper, the most relevant theoretical work is Spencer and
Qiu (2001).  They model the vertical long-term relationships that exist in Japanese automobile
keiretsu and examine the effect of these relationships on US-Japan trade in auto parts.  Their
model helps to explain US-Japan trade friction in this sector resulting from asymmetric
information regarding investment rents generated by long-term buyer-supplier relationships.  
This paper adds to the theoretical literature on this topic by examining the impact of
business and social networks on international trade.  The paper also is the first to consider how
networks affect foreign direct investment (FDI).  A model of multi-product firms with
asymmetric network effects produces the possibility of an asymmetric equilibrium in which the
firm from the country with stronger network effects (the home country) invests abroad while the
foreign firm does not.  The home firm’s foreign affiliate then exports back to its home market,
sometimes selling more than the foreign firm does through its exports from the same production3
location.  The home firm’s affiliate also sells more in the foreign market than the foreign firm
sells (on a per-variety basis) in its own market.  
Network effects are modeled as a variable cost disadvantage faced by the foreign firm
selling in the home market, regardless of the foreign firm’s production location.  Business
networks may make entry into a particular market more difficult, both for exporters and for
foreign investors.  The cost reflects the resource expenditure needed to compensate for the lack
of a pre-existing relationship with buyers.  This relationship is based on the historical, cultural
and/or language ties that exist between buyers and sellers from the same country.  The cost also
may reflect strategic choices made by these agents in the past.  Relationship-specific investments
have been examined by Spencer and Qiu (2001) and by many others as a way of explaining long-
term buyer-supplier relationships within keiretsu groups in Japan.
4  My model is a similar
attempt to incorporate linkages between buyers and sellers into a model of international trade,
but I focus on the trade and FDI decisions of firms rather than on the trade and relationship-
specific investment decisions made by buyers and parts suppliers.
5  
My model is particularly useful in explaining asymmetries in US-Japan bilateral trade
and FDI that have led to trade friction in recent years.  Data on these asymmetric flows is
presented in the next section.  
2.  Stylized Facts on US-Japan Trade and FDI Asymmetries
Trade friction between the US and Japan often is linked to asymmetric trade and
investment flows.  Japanese firms both invest more in and export more to the US.  Japan’s
average annual bilateral merchandise trade surplus with the US was $72.9 billion and the average
annual bilateral FDI deficit was $4.6 billion for 1998-2000.
6  The trade and investment
imbalance is particularly large in the automotive sector.  Japan’s bilateral trade surplus with the4
US in SITC 781 (autos) and 784 (auto parts) in 1998 was $28.6 billion.
7  Four of Japan’s major
auto producers have solely-owned auto production facilities in the US (Honda, Mitsubishi,
Nissan and Toyota) and three others (Isuzu, Fuji and Mazda) plus Toyota have joint venture auto
plants there.  American auto producers have no solely-owned production plants in Japan, but
they have increased their equity holdings in Japanese producers over the past 5 years.
8  These
trade and FDI imbalances imply strong competitive pressures on US firms in their home market.
The larger presence of Japanese affiliates in the US leads to larger flows of reverse
imports from the US to Japan than vice versus.  Nonbank Japanese affiliates in the US sent $28.4
billion in reverse imports to Japan in 1997.
9  Nonbank majority-owned American affiliates in
Japan reverse imported $4.1 billion in 1994.
10  Japanese affiliates reverse imported 6.4% of their
total sales while US affiliates reverse imported 4.2% in the different years.  These numbers show
that the tendency to reverse import out of total sales is not very different.  What is different,
however, is the aggregate volume of reverse imports and the role they play in a country’s total
imports.  Reverse imports accounted for 51.2% of Japan’s total imports from the US in 1987 and
39.8% in 1997, while reverse imports accounted for only 3.4% of US imports from Japan in
1994.  This wide gap is apparent not only in comparing Japanese affiliates in America to
American affiliates in Japan, but also in comparing the former to third-country affiliates in
America.  The almost 40% share of Japan’s total bilateral imports held by reverse imports from
Japanese affiliates in the US in 1997 is much higher than the 0.5% to 13.6% range for affiliates
of firms from other industrialized countries.
11  I propose that these differences stem at least
partially from asymmetric network effects.  That is, relationships between buyers and sellers
matter more in Japan, so Japanese firms have a stronger advantage in selling in their home
market. 5
Some of the asymmetries in US-Japan bilateral sectoral trade and FDI flows may be
explained by differences in market size and investment costs.  Simply put, the US market is
larger and average real estate prices lower than in Japan.  The former leads to larger US imports
and both lead to larger inflows of direct investment into the US.  However, these market
differences cannot explain why a Japanese affiliate in the US might export more back to Japan
than a US competitor exports to Japan.
12  To explain the advantage that Japanese firms appear to
have in making sales to Japanese consumers and to other Japanese firms, I turn to network
effects.  Other alternative hypotheses are discussed in the paper’s conclusion.
The next section describes the basic model, which follows Baldwin and Ottaviano’s
(2001) model of reciprocal trade and FDI by multi-product multinationals.  Baldwin and
Ottaviano (hereafter referred to as B&O) develop a model to describe two-way flows of FDI
across developed countries in a single industry.  In their model with complete symmetry across
countries, an asymmetric equilibrium with a one-way flow of FDI is never an equilibrium
outcome.  To describe asymmetries in US-Japan FDI flows, I introduce asymmetric network
effects to the basic model and analyze the resulting equilibria in the subsequent section, followed
by concluding comments.
3.  The Basic Model
Until network costs are introduced, the model and notation follow those in B&O.
13
Assume a two-country (home and foreign), two-sector (X and Z) world where the X sector is
characterized by imperfect competition and the Z sector by perfect competition.  Each country is
endowed with L units of labor and has one producer in the X sector producing differentiated
products with costs  ( ) x wF ax +  per variety, where w is the wage, F is the fixed cost, ax is the
variable cost and x is output.  Each firm may choose to locate production of a variety abroad by6
incurring an additional fixed cost, Γ, which represents the cost of multinationality (i.e., Γ > 0).
Each variety is produced in a single plant located in either the home or foreign country.
In period one, firms decide whether to locate production of a variety abroad or not.  In
period two, firms make output decisions.  The equilibrium concept is subgame perfect Nash and
the Pareto refinement is used in cases of multiple equilibria.  Firms may export their varieties to
the foreign market by paying a per unit trade cost, t, t > 0.  This trade cost covers transportation
costs and any existing trade barriers.  Markets are assumed to be segmented.  To maintain
tractability in the model, I assume each firm produces only two varieties.
14  The home firm
produces varieties 1 and 2, the foreign firm produces varieties 3 and 4.  
The Z good is produced with cost function  z wa Z , where az is the unit input coefficient.
Units are chosen such that az=1, and L serves as numeraire so the price of Z is unity.
Consumer preferences in each country are defined by the following utility function:
(1) ()
4 2
12 34 1 3 4 2 4 3 1 / 2 () () xi i i U Z U Z ax x bx x bx x x cx dx x cx dx
= =+ =+ + − − − + − + ∑ .
All of the X varieties are substitutes, so product substitutability parameters b, c and d are
positive.  The following parameter restrictions are necessary and sufficient for a concave utility
function:  a>0, b<1, c-d<1-b, d-c<1-b, c+d<1+b.  The inverse demand functions derived from
utility maximization are:
(2) 11 2 3 4 jj j j j pa xb xc xd x =− − − − ; 22 1 4 3 jj j j j pa xb x c xd x =− − − − ;
33 4 1 2 jj j j j pa xb xc x d x =− − − − ; 44 3 2 1 jj j j j pa xb xc xd x =− − − − ;
where  ij p  is the price of variety i in market j (j=h,f).  The linear inverse demand functions allow
me to assume ax=0 without loss of generality.7
4.  Introducing Network Effects
Network effects are introduced in the model in the form of an additional per unit cost, n,
that the foreign firm must pay in order to sell its product in the home market regardless of the
foreign firm’s production location.
15  This added cost for the foreign firm of doing business in
the home market differs from traditional trade barriers that are imposed at the border.  In other
words, the cost cannot be avoided by direct investment in the home country.  The added cost
may reflect search costs involved in locating buyers, distribution costs and/or information costs
that are assumed to be higher for “outsiders” in some markets.  As was mentioned in the paper’s
introduction, the home firm’s advantage in selling to home buyers may be determined
exogenously by the home country’s history, geography or culture or it may be determined
endogenously by relationship-specific investments made in the past by home buyers and/or
sellers.
16  
Admittedly, network effects may exist in both markets, giving local firms in either
country an advantage in selling to local buyers.  My focus, however, is on asymmetric network
effects across countries.  Therefore, I assume zero network costs in the foreign market and
positive network costs in the home market to maintain simplicity while studying the effects of
asymmetric costs.  The model is solved through backward induction, starting with the period two
equilibrium.
4.1  Period Two Equilibrium
In the second period, firms choose their outputs, having already located their production
plants in one or both countries.  The following cases describe the four possible equilibrium types:
the N-type equilibrium where both firms are national firms, the M-type equilibrium where both
firms become multinational through reciprocal FDI, and two A-type equilibria in which the firms8
make asymmetric choices.  The A-type equilibrium solutions are algebraically very lengthy even
if I assume the firms have symmetric costs (i.e.,  0 n = ).  Therefore, to maintain tractability while
adding complexity in the form of asymmetric costs, I sacrifice complexity in terms of product
variety.  For the remainder of the paper, I focus on the case with full symmetry across products
(i.e., bcd ==).
17
N-type equilibrium with network costs
When both firms are national or N-type firms, they face the following maximization
problems in period two:
(3) 11 1 1 22 2 2 max ( ) ( ) 2 hh f f hh f f px p tx px p tx F +−+ +− − ;
33 3 3 44 4 4 max ( ) ( ) 2 ff h h ff h h p x p t nx p x p t nx F +− − + +− − − .
The foreign firm must pay the network cost, n, on top of the trade cost, t, for each unit of
varieties 3 and 4 exported to the home market.  Solving these maximization problems produces













































With market segmentation, the introduction of network effects in the home market has no
impact on equilibrium outputs in the foreign market.  Therefore, the equilibrium outputs in the
foreign market are the same as in B&O.  I assume that the equilibrium quantity of each variety is
positive in both markets, which means that the smallest quantity in (4) and (5) must be positive
(i.e.,  34 ,0
NN
hh xx> ).  Therefore, parameters must satisfy  (1 )( ) ab n t >+ +.  To give the foreign firm
the incentive to export to the home market, demand must be sufficiently high (i.e., high a),9
products sufficiently differentiated (i.e., low b) and the network and trade costs sufficiently low
(i.e., low n and t).
M-type equilibrium with network costs
In the M-type equilibrium, I assume that the home (foreign) firm locates production of
variety 2 (4) abroad, without loss of generality.  The firms face the following:
(6) 1 1 1122 2 2 max ( ) ( ) 2 hh f f h h f f px p tx p tx p x F +−+−+ − − Γ ;
33 3 3 4 4 4 4 max ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 ff h h f f h h p x p t nx p tx p nx F +− − +− +− − − Γ .
Profit maximization results in the following equilibrium quantities in the home market:
(7) []
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These outputs can be ranked with the home firm’s home market sales,  1
M
h x , on top and
imports from the foreign firm,  3
M
h x , on the bottom.  In between these high and low outputs fall the
home firm’s reverse imports,  2
M
h x , and the foreign firm’s sales by its local affiliate,  4
M
h x .
Interestingly, the former can exceed the latter.
Reverse imports cannot exceed affiliate sales in B&O’s basic model with symmetric
costs (i.e.,  0 n = ) because the symmetry results in only two equilibrium output levels, one level
for the two locally-produced varieties and a lower level for the two imported varieties.  In this
paper’s model, asymmetric network costs lead to a different output level for each of the four
varieties sold in the home market in the M-type equilibrium.  Reverse imports exceed sales by
the foreign firm’s affiliate if  (1 ) nb t −> .  High network costs, low substitutability across10
products (i.e., a low cannibalization effect
18) and low trade costs boost reverse imports relative to
sales by the foreign firm’s local affiliate.
The equilibrium outputs in the foreign market are the same as in B&O:
(8) 23
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Varieties 2 and 3 are produced in the foreign market, while varieties 1 and 4 are produced in the
home market for sale in the foreign market.  Due to trade costs, the former exceed the latter. 
To insure that all equilibrium quantities in the M-type equilibrium are positive, I compare
the smallest output levels across markets and find  31 4
MMM
hf f xxx <=.  The foreign firm exports less
to the home market,  3
M
h x , than the home firm exports to the foreign market,  1
M
f x , due to the
asymmetric network cost.  To insure positive equilibrium output of each variety, parameters
must satisfy  3
M
h x  > 0 or 
2 2( 1 ) 2( 1 ) ( 2 ) 0 ab nbt b −− − − +> .
A-type equilibria with network effects
Two asymmetric equilibria must be examined, one in which the home firm is the only
multinational firm and other in which the foreign firm is the only multinational.  With the cost
disadvantage faced by the foreign firm, the A-type equilibrium with a multinational foreign firm
can be shown to never be subgame perfect so these solutions are not reported here.
19  The A-type
equilibrium with a multinational home firm involves the following maximization problems:
(9) 1 1 1122 2 2 max ( ) ( ) 2 hh f f h h f f px p tx p tx p x F +−+−+ − − Γ ;
33 3 3 44 4 4 max ( ) ( ) 2 ff h h ff h h p x p t nx p x p t nx F +− − + +− − − .
The home market equilibrium outputs are:
(10)   []
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The home firm’s sales of the home-produced variety (i.e.,  1
AM
h x ) top the per-variety output
ranking, but the ordering of the others depends upon parameter values.  While reverse imports
always exceed regular imports (on a per-variety basis) in the M-type equilibrium, in the A-type
equilibrium this holds only if 2( 1 ) nb t b >− .  That is, high network costs, low substitutability
across products and low trade costs boost the home firm’s reverse imports relative to imports
from the foreign firm.  Both types of imports are higher in the A-type equilibrium because they
do not have to compete with a locally-produced foreign variety, as in the M-type equilibrium.
Per-variety imports from the foreign firm increase more than reverse imports in moving from an
M-type to an A-type equilibrium because the foreign firm is not cannibalizing its own locally-
produced variety by importing in the A-type equilibrium. 
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These foreign market outputs can be ranked as follows:   234 1
AM AN AN AM
fff f xxxx >=>.  This
means that sales are highest for the home firm’s foreign affiliate, followed by foreign market
sales by the foreign firm, and lastly by exports from the home firm to the foreign market.  The
lower cannibalization effect between the home firm’s two varieties after FDI has occurred results
in the highest per variety sales for the home firm’s overseas affiliate.  These output comparisons
can be summarized as follows:12
Result 1:  In the A-type equilibrium with a multinational home firm and a national foreign firm,
the home firm has the top-selling variety in both markets.  If 2( 1 ) nb t b >− , the home firm also
has the second-highest-selling variety in its home market through reverse imports from its
overseas affiliate.
This result illustrates how asymmetric network effects can lead to asymmetric sales
outcomes that favor the firm from the country with stronger network effects.  One would expect
this firm to sell more of its home-produced variety at home than foreign competitors could sell
there.  What is somewhat more surprising is that asymmetric FDI decisions can result in an
outcome where the home firm’s foreign affiliate has the top-selling variety in the foreign market
and may have the second-highest-selling variety in its home market.
20  After establishing the
conditions to insure positive equilibrium outputs in the A-type equilibrium, I compare profits
across the various equilibria to see what conditions produce the A-type equilibrium outcome.
To insure positive output of each variety in each market, I compare the lowest values in
each market (i.e.,  2
AM
h x ,  3
AN
h x  and  1
AM
f x ).  It is easy to show  21
AM AM
hf xx > ; that is, reverse imports
into the home market where only one variety is produced locally exceed imports into the foreign
market where three varieties are locally produced.  Therefore, parameters must be chosen such
that  3
AN
h x  and  1
AM
f x  are positive (i.e., 2 (2 ) 2( ) 0 abnt nt −+ − + >  and
2 2( 1 ) ( 2 2 ) 0 ab t b b −− +− > ).
4.2  Period One Equilibrium
The firms’ equilibrium profits in the three possible equilibria
21 must be compared to
determine the parameter range over which each equilibrium is subgame perfect (SGP).  For an
equilibrium to be SGP, the firms must not have an incentive to deviate to an alternative
equilibrium.  For example, the M-type equilibrium is SGP if neither firm wants to deviate to an13
A-type equilibrium in which it is a national, rather than a multinational firm.  That is, the M-type
equilibrium is SGP if  2 2
MA N
kk FF ππ −− Γ > − for  , kh f =  where 
M
k π  (
AN
k π ) is the operating
profits of firm k in the M-type equilibrium (A-type equilibrium where it is the only national
firm).  Similarly, the N-type equilibrium is SGP if neither firm wants to deviate by directly
investing abroad.  Cases of multiple equilibria are handled by determining which equilibrium
Pareto dominates (dom) the other(s).  By stating that profits in a given equilibrium exceed profits
from deviation, the following conditions establish the period one equilibrium:
(12) M is SGP:  
MA N
hh ππ −Γ>  and 
MA N
ff ππ −Γ>
(13) N is SGP:  
NA M
hh ππ >− Γ  and 
NA M
ff ππ >− Γ
(14) M dom N:  
MN




(15) A is SGP:  
AM N
hh ππ −Γ>  and 
AN M
ff ππ >− Γ
Using the equilibrium profits, the two constraints can be reduced to just one binding
constraint for the first three cases above, as follows:
(12’) M is SGP:  
MA N
ff ππ −Γ>
(13’) N is SGP:  
NA M
hh ππ >− Γ
(14’) M dom N: 
MN
ff ππ −Γ>
The A-type equilibrium is subgame perfect for a bounded range of Γ values (i.e.,
() ()
AM N M AN
hh f f ππ π π −> Γ >− ).  The critical values of Γ for the A-type equilibrium are the same
as the critical values of Γ for the N- and M-type equilibria.  Let  ()
AM N
hh ππ Γ= −  and
()
MA N
ff ππ Γ= − .  As long as Γ>Γ and  0 Γ> , a range of Γ values exists for which the A-type
equilibrium is SGP.  14
Result 2:  If Γ>Γ and  0 Γ> , the A-type equilibrium with an M-type home firm and an N-type
foreign firm is the only subgame perfect equilibrium over a range of Γ values bounded by
max(0, ) Γ  and Γ.  The conditions to insure Γ>Γ and  0 Γ>  are nb t >  and
22 (2 4 3 ) 2 (1 )(1 ) 0 bt b b n b b ++ − − + > , respectively. 
Proof of Result 2 is included in the Appendix.  The above conditions imply that the A-
type equilibrium can occur when network costs are sufficiently high relative to trade costs and
product substitutability, but not so high that the home firm lacks the incentive to invest abroad.
Since 1 b <  by definition, network costs can be lower than trade costs but still satisfy the nb t >
condition needed to produce the A-type equilibrium. 
Figures 1-3 illustrate the effect that asymmetric network costs have on the equilibrium
parameter space.  Figure 1 reproduces B&O’s Figure 1, showing the equilibrium parameter space
when costs are symmetric across the two markets (i.e.,  0 n = ) and the boundaries are plotted in
()
2 , bt Γ  space.  As they describe, “Increasing ‘b’ exacerbates the cannibalisation effect and thus
encourages FDI, and the cannibalisation-reducing effect of FDI is magnified by trade costs, t.
By raising the cost of separating production, a high Γ has the opposite effect.”  (B&O, p. 441)
The N-type outcome is a Nash equilibrium above the ‘N is SGP’ line (i.e., in regions 1 and 2)
and the M-type outcome is a Nash equilibrium below the ‘M is SGP’ line (i.e., in regions 2, 3
and 4). In region 2 where both symmetric outcomes are Nash equilibria, the N-type equilibrium
Pareto dominates the M-type equilibrium, since the ‘M dom N’ line lies below the ‘N is SGP’
line.
23  Therefore, the M-type equilibrium prevails only in regions 3 and 4.  In this case with
0 n = , there is no parameter space where the A-type equilibrium is SGP. 15
Allowing asymmetric network costs introduces the possibility of an A-type equilibrium,
as shown in Figures 2 and 3.  To plot the boundaries in two-dimensions, I assume  0.75 nt =  in
Figure 2 and nt =  in Figure 3.  The ‘N is SGP’ line represents the upper boundary for the A-
type equilibrium, Γ, when  1 t = .  The lower boundary, Γ, is represented by the ‘M is SGP’ line
when 1 t = .  The A-type equilibrium is the only SGP equilibrium in region 5.  The N-type
equilibrium prevails in regions 1 and 2 and the M-type equilibrium prevails in regions 3 and 4.
Intuitively, it makes sense that if the cost of multinationality, Γ, is very high (or the trade cost, t,
is very low) neither firm will choose to invest abroad.  In this case, the N-type equilibrium will
prevail.  As 
2 t Γ  decreases it becomes more attractive for the firms to invest abroad.  The
asymmetry in network costs means that the critical value for investing abroad occurs at a higher
value of 
2 t Γ  for the home firm than for the foreign firm, thus making the A-type equilibrium
possible.  For very low 
2 t Γ  values, both firms invest abroad so only the M-type equilibrium is
SGP.  
In Figure 2 with  0.75 nt = , 0.75 b >  does not satisfy the condition to insure Γ>Γ
(nb t > ), so no A-type equilibrium occurs for 0.75 1 b ≤<.  That is, with low network costs
relative to trade costs, strong cannibalization effects (i.e., high b) drive the firms to make
symmetric decisions regarding FDI.  With higher network costs illustrated in Figure 3 (i.e.,
nt = ), the A-type equilibrium is possible over the entire range of values of ‘b’, the product
differentiation parameter.
Comparing across the three figures illustrates a positive relationship between the level of
network costs and the range of parameter values that produce an A-type equilibrium.  The higher
the network costs, the greater the asymmetry between firms and therefore the greater the
potential for an asymmetric equilibrium. 16
4.3  Profits
By definition the A-type equilibrium gives each firm higher profits than it could achieve
by deviating in making its own FDI decision (see equation (15)).  In the A-type equilibrium, the
home firm earns higher profits than it would in an N-type equilibrium and the foreign firm earns
higher profits than in an M-type equilibrium.  Although a firm cannot control its rival’s strategic
choice, it does have a preference over its rival’s behavior.  This preference may provide insights
into the lobbying behavior of the firms.  Equilibrium profits can be used to show the following:
Result 3:  The home firm prefers an asymmetric equilibrium in which it is the only multinational
firm to a symmetric outcome with two multinational firms.  The foreign firm prefers an outcome
in which neither firm is multinational to the asymmetric equilibrium where its rival is a
multinational firm.
Proof of Result 3 is included in the Appendix.  Result 3 establishes the context for trade
friction to arise in the differentiated product sector.  In cases where an M-type equilibrium would
occur otherwise (i.e., for 0 <Γ<Γ), the home firm has an incentive to block this outcome by
preventing FDI inflow into its market as long as it intends to invest abroad (i.e., for Γ<Γ).  The
foreign firm has an incentive to prevent FDI inflow into its market whenever an A-type
equilibrium would occur otherwise (for Γ<Γ<Γ).  Although my model does not provide a
context in which firms can strategically deter entry into their domestic markets, Result 3 suggest
that they might like to do so if they could.  The firms could prevent FDI inflows by raising the
cost of direct investment in their particular market (i.e., raising a market-specific version of Γ).
The home firm also could accomplish this goal by raising network costs, n.17
4.4  Reverse Imports
The model allows for comparisons of reverse imports and regular imports across different
equilibria.  The stylized facts mentioned earlier show much larger flows of reverse imports from
the US to Japan than vice versus.  They also show Japan’s reverse imports as a share of total
bilateral imports to be much higher than that for the US or for other developed countries with
affiliates in the US.  Simple comparisons of equilibrium outputs shown above match these
stylized facts as follows:
Result 4:  In the M-type equilibrium, the home country’s reverse imports exceed the foreign
country’s reverse imports due to the asymmetric network costs.  In this equilibrium, the home
country’s reverse imports exceed regular imports.  This result holds true in the A-type
equilibrium as well if 2( 1 ) nb t b >− .
Result 5:  In the M-type equilibrium, reverse imports account for a higher share of total imports
for the home country than for the foreign country due to the asymmetric network costs.
The share of reverse imports in total imports for the foreign country is ½.  For the home
country where n > 0, reverse imports exceed regular imports, as stated previously, so the share of
total imports held by reverse imports exceeds ½.
4.5  Sales
To develop some intuition regarding the impact of network effects on consumer welfare,
I examine the impact on total sales in each equilibrium.
























































+ ∑ ; j=M for i=1,2 and j=N for i=3,4.
In the N- and M-type equilibria, two varieties are produced in each market and two
varieties are imported.  As shown in (16) and (17), the total sales across these two equilibria are
the same for the home market and for the foreign market.  Due to network costs, the total sales in
the foreign market exceed those in the home market by  (1 2 ) nb + .  In the A-type equilibrium,
sales in the foreign market exceed those in the home market by an even larger value,
() ( 1 2 ) nt b ++ , because three varieties are produced in the foreign market in this case versus
only one produced in the home market. 
Comparing across equilibria, sales in the home market are lower in the A-type
equilibrium than in either N- or M-type equilibrium because fewer varieties are produced locally
(i.e., one versus two locally-produced varieties).  Sales are highest in the foreign market with
three varieties produced there in the A-type equilibrium relative to the other two equilibrium
types.  Despite these country-level differences across equilibria, the worldwide (i.e., two-
country) sales are the same in each equilibrium and equal to (4 2 ) (1 2 ) an t b −− + .  Network
costs in the home country cause a decrease in worldwide sales of  (1 2 ) nb + , with all of this
decrease suffered by the home country in the N and M-type equilibria, and an even larger
decrease (and corresponding increase for the foreign country) in the A-type equilibrium.
4.6  Trade Displacement
B&O use a ‘trade displacement metric’ (TDM) to capture the change in bilateral sectoral
trade of the differentiated product in switching from an equilibrium with N-type firms to one
with M-type firms.  Since my model has more than one alternative to the N-type equilibrium, I19
calculate several displacement metrics.  The 
ij TDM  captures the change in bilateral sectoral
trade in switching from the i-type equilibrium to the j-type equilibrium.  Using the traded
quantities in (4), (5), (7), (8), (10) and (11), the TDM’s in my model are:
(23) 
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For 0 n = , 
NM TDM  matches that in B&O and is positive, indicating that trade declines when
firms switch from N-type to M-type.  That is, reciprocal FDI displaces some, but not all, trade as
long as products are imperfect substitutes (i.e., b < 1).
25  The other two metrics, 
NA TDM  and
AM TDM , also are positive for  0 n = .  The equations in (23) through (25) make it quite apparent
that all of the TDM’s are decreasing in n.  What is not readily apparent, but is proven in the
Appendix, is that the TDM’s remain positive over the range of parameters that allow for each
equilibrium.  This result can be stated as follows:
Result 6:  Asymmetric network costs lower, but do not completely eliminate, the trade
displacement that results from one-way or reciprocal FDI.  
This result will help in interpreting the effect of network costs on consumer welfare since
trade displacement represents an efficiency improvement through the elimination of trade costs. 
4.7  Consumer Welfare
Consumer welfare is calculated by substituting equilibrium quantities into the utility
function in (1).
26  Unfortunately, the algebraic complexity introduced by asymmetric costs make
it impossible to strictly sign welfare comparisons across equilibria in most cases.  Instead, I20
compare consumer welfare by assigning parameter values that allow for the possibility of an A-
type equilibrium and that satisfy the restrictions mentioned previously (i.e., to insure a concave
utility function and positive sales of each variety in each market.)  
Table 1 shows equilibrium consumer welfare using four sets of parameter values.  Cases
1-3 illustrate the effect of varying the network cost, n, and cases 2 and 4 show the outcomes with
different levels of product differentiation, b.  The Γ range is created using the conditions stated in
Result 2 for establishing the existence of the A-type equilibrium.  The lower bound is  [] max ,0 Γ
and the upper bound is Γ.  If  0 Γ> , the M-type equilibrium prevails for 0 <Γ<Γ.  For Γ>Γ,
the N-type equilibrium occurs.  As shown in Table 1, the parameters chosen in cases 1 and 2
allow for all three equilibrium types as Γ increases from zero, but those chosen in cases 3 and 4
never produce the M-type equilibrium (i.e.,  0 Γ< ).  When  0 Γ= , the latter two cases fall within
regions 1 and 5 in Figures 2 and 3.  When the network cost, n, is sufficiently high and/or when
product substitutability, b, is sufficiently low, the foreign firm never chooses to invest abroad.
The shaded cells in Table 1 show the preferred outcomes over the Γ range that results in
an A-type equilibrium (i.e., Γ<Γ<Γ).  Although algebraic complexity preclude generalizing
these results, the consistency of the equilibrium rankings in these simulations is appealing.  In
every case, home consumers’ utility is lowest in the A-type equilibrium and highest in the N-type
equilibrium over this Γ range.  In other words, home consumers would prefer to not allow a one-
way outflow of FDI from their country.  This makes sense since they pay the costs of importing
three, rather than two, varieties in the asymmetric equilibrium.  In Case 1, for very low values of
Γ (0 0.094 <Γ< ) the home consumers prefer the M-type equilibrium that will occur, but for
higher values that will produce the M-type equilibrium (0.094 0.3 <Γ<Γ= ), the home21
consumers would be better off with neither inflows nor outflows of FDI.  This simulation result
can be generalized by examining the gap between 
M
h U  and 
N
h U .  
(26)
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The difference in (26) is decreasing in n since b < 1 implies 
2 (3 2 ) 0 bb −+ + < .  Increasing the
network cost lowers the 
MN
hh UU −  line so that it eventually falls below the ‘N is SGP’ line.  This
implies that consumers do not always gain from a switch from the N-type to the M-type
equilibrium.
Result 7:  In contrast to B&O’s results showing that consumers are better off with reciprocal
FDI whenever it occurs, asymmetric network costs introduce the possibility that consumers in
the country with strong network effects lose from reciprocal FDI.
Consumers in the home country gain from reciprocal FDI only when the cost of
multinationality and the network cost are sufficiently low.  Network costs lower the gains from
reciprocal FDI by lowering the amount of trade displacement resulting from FDI.  Lower trade
displacement means lower efficiency gains to be shared between the two firms, foreign
consumers and home consumers. 
As shown in Table 1, the foreign country’s consumer welfare is always highest in the A-
type equilibrium as the recipient of one-way FDI.  Consumers gain by having three varieties
locally produced.  This means that for cases where the M-type equilibrium would occur (i.e.,
0 <Γ<Γ), foreign consumers have an incentive to discourage the outflow of FDI.  For cases
where the N-type equilibrium would occur (i.e., Γ>Γ), foreign consumers have an incentive to
encourage the inflow of FDI.  Since network costs are zero in the foreign country, B&O’s result22
that consumers are better off with reciprocal FDI is seen in the simulation results and can be
easily proven (i.e., 
MN
ff UU >  for Γ<Γ).
5.  Conclusions
This paper generalizes Baldwin and Ottaviano’s (2001) analysis of reciprocal FDI and
trade by allowing for asymmetric outcomes.  I introduce asymmetries in the importance of
network effects across countries to explain asymmetric flows of trade and FDI at the industry
level.  As modeled, stronger network linkages between home buyers and sellers give the home
firm a variable cost advantage in selling a differentiated product to home market buyers.  The
asymmetric network cost introduces the possibility of an asymmetric equilibrium with a
multinational home firm and a national foreign firm.  Even when the two firms make symmetric
FDI decisions (i.e., both are national firms or both are multinational firms), asymmetric network
costs lead to asymmetric output decisions by the firms and therefore asymmetric trade flows.  
The model’s predictions fit some of the observed trade and investment asymmetries
between the US and Japan.  Higher network costs in the Japanese market may lead to an
asymmetric equilibrium with a one-way flow of FDI from Japan to the US in a given industry.
In this equilibrium, the Japanese firm has the top-selling variety in both markets, and it may have
the second-highest-selling variety in its home market through reverse imports from its US
affiliate.  In this case, the asymmetric network effects have caused asymmetry in both trade and
investment flows.  The Japanese firm is satisfied with the asymmetric status quo, as are
American consumers.  The US firm, however, would prefer an equilibrium with no inflow of
FDI into its market.  Japanese consumers also are not satisfied with the status quo and have an
incentive to try to prevent FDI outflows in most cases.  If network costs and the cost of
multinationality are sufficiently low, however, Japanese consumers may prefer to promote FDI23
inflows.  Existing import promotion policies in Japan may benefit Japanese consumers
(including firms purchasing inputs) by compensating for high network costs.  As described in
Greaney (2001), these policies lower the fixed cost of investing in Japan’s market or lower the
network costs of “finding” buyers (e.g., by sponsoring import trade fairs to introduce foreign
sellers to Japanese buyers).  
Even in equilibria where firms make symmetric FDI decisions, asymmetric network
effects help to explain asymmetric trade flows.  When both firms invest abroad, Japan’s reverse
imports exceeds America’s reverse imports.  Japan’s reverse imports also exceed its imports
from the American firm, while America’s reverse imports matches its imports from the Japanese
firm.  The latter result helps to explain the observation that reverse imports account for a much
larger share of Japan’s total imports than they do for other industrialized countries. 
This paper’s networks-based explanation certainly cannot account for all asymmetric
outcomes in US-Japan trade and FDI at the industry level.  Alternative explanations, such as
comparative advantage, trade barriers and outsourcing, play a role in many sectors.
27  Baldwin
and Ottaviano (2001) discuss the contribution of their model as providing an explanation for the
observed complementarity between FDI and trade at the product level,
28 using examples of trade
mainly between European countries.  This complementarity is difficult to explain with existing
models of multinational behavior.  The added-value provided in this paper is incorporating
asymmetric network effects that lead to asymmetric outcomes and the possibility of trade
friction.  Existing models of multinationals cannot explain the observation that Honda and
Toyota export autos to the US, produce cars in the US and export some of these back to Japan,
often exporting more to Japan than their American competitors.  Network effects help to explain
the advantage that Japanese firms appear to have in making sales to Japanese consumers and to24
other Japanese firms.  A question left for further research is to what extent network effects can be
endogenously determined either by firms or governments and to what extent they are
exogenously endowed by a country’s history, geography or culture.  Also left for future research
are questions as to the efficiency advantages that may come from networks or long-term buyer-
supplier relationships.  My model only examines the disadvantage faced by those “outside” the
network; it does not consider that the network itself may generate efficiency advantages through
repeated trading or relationship-specific investment.25
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1 The research papers for a 1996 conference on this topic were published in the Journal of
International Economics in 1999, with an introduction provided by Rauch and Feenstra (1999).
2 See Fung (1991) and Lawrence (1991) on keiretsu and Rauch and Trindade (1999) on overseas
Chinese networks.
3 During the Structural Impediments Initiatives (SII) Talks between the US and Japan in 1989,
US negotiators complained that keiretsu served to limit foreign access to the Japanese market.
However, Sheard (1992) examined arguments regarding the anti-competitive nature of keiretsu
groups and concluded that there is nothing inherently anti-competitive in the keiretsu structure.
4 See, for example, Aoki (1988) and Asanuma (1989).
5 In Spencer and Qiu (2001), trade and the advantages of network linkages are endogenous while
production location is exogenous.  In my model, trade and production location are endogenous
while network effects are exogenous.
6 Trade and FDI balance data are from the US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis website.
7 Statistics Canada (1998).
8 See Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association (2001) for details.
9 Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (2000).27
                                                                                                                                                            
10 BEA (1998).  This survey and BEA (2000) are conducted only once every five years and in
differing years so matching-year data is not available.  The surveys also differ in reporting
reverse imports either by all nonbank affiliates or by majority-owned nonbank affiliates.
11 The BEA (2000) data allow one to match affiliates’ country of ultimate beneficial owner to
their export destinations only for the following seven countries, along with Japan:  Australia,
Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK.
12 For example, in the contentious automotive sector, Japanese affiliates in the US exported more
to Japan than the US Big Three between 1991 and 1996, according to data on new import car
registrations (Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, 1999).
13 The reader is referred to B&O for future justification for the basic model’s assumptions.
14 An earlier version of B&O, Baldwin and Ottaviano (1998), allows firms to produce a
continuum of varieties.
15 Alternatively, I could assume that network effects take the form of an added fixed cost of
investing in the home market.  In other words, it costs more to become a “local” producer in this
market, but once a firm has made this investment, it faces no additional hurdles in doing business
there.  This type of assumption would allow for an asymmetric equilibrium in terms of the FDI
decision made by firms, but it would not generate asymmetric output decisions by firms.  Both
types of asymmetries are useful for explaining the importance of reverse importing for Japan’s
total imports.
16 Greaney (1997) and Greaney (2000) present alternative ways of modeling a home firm’s
advantages in selling at home.  In the former, differences in preferences across countries and
informational asymmetries in observing local preferences provide a source of proximity
advantage for multinational activity.  In the latter, home firms gain lasting advantages from past
trade protection when buyer switching costs exist.
17 B&O consider three cases in their paper, full symmetry (bcd ==), firm-wise symmetry
(bcd >=) and matching product lines (cbd >=), but most of their results rely on the algebraic
simplicity afforded by the full symmetry assumption.
18 The “cannibalization effect” refers to negative cross-variety effects experienced by
multiproduct firms.  Sales of a new variety increase revenues from that variety but decrease
revenues from a firm’s other varieties.  (Brander and Eaton, 1984)
19 See the Appendix for solutions and proof that an A-type equilibrium with a multinational
foreign firm is never subgame perfect.
20 An example of this type of equilibrium might be Honda’s or Toyota’s competition with any of
the Big Three American auto producers.  Both Japanese producers have production facilities in
the US while the US producers do not produce their cars in Japan (although they do have equity
positions in several Japanese auto producers).  In recent years, Toyota’s Camry or Honda’s
Accord has often topped the list of best-selling cars in the US, competing with Ford’s Taurus for
that distinction.  From 1991-1997, Honda exported more cars from the US to Japan than any of
the Big Three, and in 1995 Toyota did the same.
21 Equilibrium profits are shown in the Appendix.




h π π =  where k
= N, M, AN, AM.
23 B&O prove this ordering of the boundary lines.28
                                                                                                                                                            
24 A comparison of equilibrium prices, as in B&O, is uninstructive because the algebraic
complexity introduced by asymmetric costs precludes ranking products by price in most cases.
25 This is result 4 in B&O.
26 I follow B&O’s method of calculating the consumption of the Walrasian good Z as:
2( ) Z L F t imports =− − .  Production of X is assumed to be costless, after fixed costs are paid,
but importing X uses up t units of domestic L per imported unit.  For the home country, network
effects use up n units of domestic L per unit purchased from the foreign firm, so  34 ()
jj
hh nx x +  also
is subtracted from L to calculate Z consumption.  For a country with a multinational firm, Γ also
is subtracted to calculate Z consumption.
27 For example, Japanese FDI in the US in the auto sector was motivated in large part by
voluntary export restraints imposed in the 1980’s.
28 Allowing product fragmentation provides an alternative explanation for trade and FDI
complementarity.  That is, FDI in intermediate goods may lead to two-way trade flows in these
goods and final products.29
Appendix
Equilibrium Profits
Given the equilibrium outputs shown in (4) and (5), the equilibrium operating profits for
the N-type equilibrium are:
(A1)
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Equilibrium profits in this equilibrium for each firm are the operating profits less 2F, the fixed
cost of producing two varieties.
In the M-type equilibrium, operating profits are: 
(A3)  
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Operating profits less (2 ) F +Γ  give total profits for the firms in the M-type equilibrium.
The equilibrium operating profits for the A-type equilibrium with a multinational home
firm are:
(A5)  
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For the M-type home firm, operating profits less (2 ) F +Γ  give total profits.  For the N-type
foreign firm, operating profits less 2F give total profits.30
A-type Equilibrium with a Multinational Foreign Firm
The other type of asymmetric equilibrium, one in which the home firm is N-type and the
foreign firm is M-type, is SGP if: 
AN M
hh ππ >− Γ  and 
AM N
ff ππ −Γ> .  This A-type equilibrium
with a multinational foreign firm can be ruled out if:  ( ) ( ) 0
M N AN AM
hf h f ππ π π +− + > .  Using
equilibrium profits shown above,  () ( )
22 ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) 2(1 2 )
M N AN AM
hf h f bt nb t b ππ π π +− + = + + +  > 0.
Proof of Result 2
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When nb t > , the difference in (A7) is positive which establishes a range of values for Γ
that will produce the A-type equilibrium.  The expression in (A8) also must be positive to insure
that the range of Γ values includes (at least some) positive values.  Since the denominator in (A8)
is positive, I need 
22 (2 4 3 ) 2 (1 )(1 ) 0 bt b b n b b ++ − − + >  to insure  0 Γ> .  This difference is
positive for nb t = , but it may fall below zero for high values of n or low values of t that satisfy
the nb t >  condition.
i  Therefore, the expressions in both (A7) and (A8) must be positive to
insure the existence of an A-type equilibrium.
Proof of Result 3





























These inequalities show that the home firm always prefers the A-type equilibrium to the M-type
equilibrium and the foreign firm always prefers the N-type equilibrium to the A-type
equilibrium.  
Proof of Result 6
Using (23), (24) and (25),  0
NM TDM > , 0
NA TDM >  and  0
AM TDM >  when
2( 1) nb t b <− ,  3( 1) nb t b <−  and 
2 (2 ) (1 ) nb t b b <+ − , respectively.  An M-type equilibrium
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This constraint on network costs is more restrictive than the ones listed above for  0
NM TDM >
and 0
AM TDM > .  Therefore, whenever an M-type equilibrium occurs, trade displacement
occurs.  
Proving that trade displacement occurs in moving from an N-type to an A-type
equilibrium (i.e.,  0
NA TDM > ) involves using one of the two conditions needed to insure the
existence of an A-type equilibrium.  Specifically, we need  0 Γ> , which requires
22 (2 4 3 ) (2 (1 )(1 ) ) nb t b b n b b <+ + − +.  This condition implies  3( 1) nb t b <−  or  0
NA TDM > .
                                                          
i That is, the difference decreases in n and increases in t.  The effect of b on this difference
cannot be signed.b
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Case 1 7 0.7 0.75 1 0.300,
0.313
22.584 22.678-Γ 20.823-Γ 24.302 25.089-Γ 26.449
Case 2 7 0.7 1 1 0.194,
0.269
22.163 22.025-Γ 20.321-Γ 24.302 25.089-Γ 26.449
Case 3 7 0.7 1.5 1 0.0,
0.181
21.546 20.946-Γ 19.543-Γ 24.302 25.089-Γ 26.449
Case 4 7 0.6 1 1 0.0,
0.096
24.114 23.702-Γ 21.975-Γ 26.638 27.126-Γ 28.823
Notes: 1) To accurately calculate all consumer welfare results, each should have (L – 2F) added to it.  Since this table is designed to
allow comparisons of welfare across equilibria, these common terms are not shown.
2) Shaded cells show the preferred outcome over the Γ  range that result in an A-type equilibrium.